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Abstract
We analyze 69 entries and relocations by the Norwegian discount variety chain Europris
during the period 2016 to 2019. We measure how its location choices affect local grocery
stores’ performance, using a diff-in-diff strategy and data from a large Norwegian gro-
cery chain. We combine detailed data on local grocery stores’ sales, traffic and travelling
distance to new or relocated Europris stores. We find that entries and relocations have
significant effects, suggesting an S-shaped relationship; sufficiently close entries increase
local demand since more customers are attracted to the market, but, as the distance
increases, the competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and local gro-
cery sales and traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is gradually
reduced to zero. We show that this empirical finding can be squared with a simple the-
oretical model. Our results confirm theoretical conjectures on agglomeration forces and
competitive effects from local competition.
Keywords: Retail economics, local competition effects, positive agglomeration forces,
grocery markets
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we explore the rise of discount variety retail and how this has changed
the competition towards grocery stores. Over time, grocery stores have broadened their
product range into everything from books to consumer electronics. Likewise, we see a
growing trend where earlier specialized retailers like “dollar stores” and general hardware
stores add groceries to their product range. In 2019, the American discount variety chain
Dollar General expanded its product range to also include fresh grocery products, and
since 2003 they have offered food products in a number of stores.1 Today, Dollar General
delivers grocery products to more than 9,000 of its total 16,500 locations.
We have also seen a strong trend in retail towards stores co-locating in malls and
business areas. In this new retail landscape where different chains may both compete
and complement each other, store location choices become less obvious. On one hand,
differences in product range might lead to increased traffic and number of customers when
stores locate very close to one another. On the other hand, increased local competition
for the products that are offered by both chains reduces incentives to co-locate.
To understand how this new mix of product ranges and reduced retail chain special-
ization affect store localization, we analyze the location behavior of the biggest discount
variety chain in Norway, Europris. In particular, we analyze how its location choices
affect one of the largest grocery chains in Norway. Europris has been one of the most
successful retail chains in Norway, establishing a number of new stores across the country.
The grocery chain is among the leading discount grocery players in Norway. It serves
more than 20% of the national market alone, and is represented across all major regions
in Norway. More than one third of the grocery chain’s product categories are also offered
by Europris, and in terms of sales, as much as one fourth of the grocery chain’s turnover
is stemming from these product categories.
Benefiting from a very detailed grocery data set covering all transactions before and
after the arrival of competing discount variety stores, we use a diff-in-diff approach to
estimate the effect of entry. More specifically, we analyze how sales and customer traffic in
local stores within the grocery chain is affected by Europris establishments and relocations
as compared to a large control group of grocery stores that are not affected by changes in
Europris locations. In all models, we control for local competition and local demographics,
including separate detailed control variables varying on the municipal level. We also have
detailed information on the product overlap between Europris and the grocery chain,
allowing us to estimate separate effects for products that are offered by both chains and
products that are only offered by the grocery chain.
In the case we consider, an incumbent grocery store may be affected by the estab-
1The first store appeared in 1939, and in 1955 they took the name Dollar General. Hence, only after
64 years did they expand into food items.
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lishment of a discount variety store with partially overlapping product ranges in two
ways. On the one hand, because the stores only compete on a subset of their product
categories, the grocery store may get new customers due to the increased quality of their
location stemming from the complementarities across stores. Let us think about this as
an increase in the extensive margin: As long as the entering store is differentiated enough
with regards to product range, this co-location effect is likely to be positive (positive de-
mand effect). This positive effect of establishment should be stronger the closer the new
establishment is located to the incumbent grocery store, and maximized if co-location
allows for one-stop shopping. On the other hand, entry will increase competition for the
product categories offered by both stores. This can be interpreted as a reduction in the
intensive margin: some of the incumbent’s existing customers may choose to purchase
some products that they used to buy at the incumbent grocery store at the entrant dis-
count variety store (fiercer competition).2 This effect will be negative, and stronger the
closer the establishment is to the grocery store.
The net effect of the two effects outlined above is not clear. Furthermore, while we
expect both the positive and negative effects to decrease in size with distance, they may
do so at different rates and thereby give rise to a non-monotonic relationship between
distance between the stores and sales at the incumbent grocery store. For example, it
may be that the agglomeration effect is important when the stores are fairly close, while
the competition effect continues to be important also when the distance is relatively large.
In our empirical analysis, we find that one-stop shopping leads to positive agglomera-
tion effects, increasing local demand when new stores enter. Perhaps more surprising, our
results provide some support that this holds true both for competing products (offered
by both chains) and non-competing products (offered only by the grocery chain). We
also find clear evidence for a competitive effect that decreases with distance between the
stores. What we find particularly intriguing is that the interplay between the positive
agglomeration forces and the competition effect creates an S-shaped pattern: positive
agglomeration forces dominate for one stop co-locations, but as stores are located further
apart, the negative competition effect gets relatively larger. At some point, the competi-
tion effect becomes dominant before it eventually tapers off. The S-shaped relationship
between grocery sales and distance to the newly established discount variety store sug-
gests that the interplay of the positive agglomeration effect and the negative competitive
effect varies with distance between the stores.
To gain some additional insight into the mechanisms at play, we develop a simple
theoretical model that fits our empirical case closely. Using a framework inspired by
Hotelling (1927), we consider how an incumbent store is affected by the entry of a com-
petitor in its vicinity. The entrant offers a substitute to one of the incumbent’s products
2The increased competition might also affect prices, but in our case the incumbent is already using
national prices, and thus the effect of the new store will come through changes in sales.
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at a lower price. This increases the overall value of shopping in the area where the two
stores are located. While greater competition for products that are sold in both stores
reduces the incumbent’s sales to existing customers, the improved quality of the location
attracts new customers. We find that the overall effect on sales may have an S-shape
similar to what we observe in the empirical analysis. Assuming that one-stop shopping
is feasible and provides an additional benefit, the increased sales to new customers out-
weigh the lost sales due to existing customers buying the substitute from the entrant.
However, if the distance between the stores prevents one-stop shopping, the competition
effect prevails. In line with the empirical results, we find that also the competition effect
eventually fades out as the distance between the stores becomes sufficiently large.
We now discuss our empirical results in more detail. In our first main empirical
analysis, we use a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the effect of establishments of discount
variety stores on grocery stores’ sales. When we distinguish between the new entries that
allow for one-stop shopping and those that require customers to stop twice, we see a
distinct pattern: one-stop shopping increases sales by nearly 9%, whereas entries that
require the customers to stop twice have a negative impact on the incumbents’ sales
(-4%). The same pattern holds for store traffic.
The next question we address is how the magnitude of the two effects depend on
the distance between the incumbent and the new store. We explore this question by
splitting the two-stop shopping entries into different distance bins and re-estimating our
models. We now uncover an intriguing pattern. When we move away from one-stop
shopping and up to a distance of two km, we find a small negative effect (for competing
products) on sales from new entries (-3%). For entries between two and five km away,
the negative effect (for all products) is much larger (-7% to -9%), although it gets smaller
and ultimately fades off for entries even further away.
We attribute this S-shape to the interplay between the two margins. For the entries
relatively close by (250 meters to two km), the extensive margin effect of higher local
demand still has some influence, though the intensive margin effect of fiercer competition
dominates. As we move further away (in our case beyond two km), the competition
effect peaks, generating the maximum negative overall effect. And as we move even
further away in distance, the net effect goes towards zero, which is what we would expect
given that both effects should taper off eventually. Interestingly, we find much the same
pattern for both competing and non-competing product categories, but the effects are,
not surprisingly, higher for the former group.
We show that the results are robust to including controls for local competition, de-
mographics and cases where the change in distance is so small that we are unable to tell
whether the distance has actually decreased. We also perform a Granger test to exam-
ine the presence of anticipatory effects and reverse causality, concluding that the test is
consistent with our econometric diff-in-diff models.
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Related literature Stahl (1982) was one of the first to model the trend towards co-
location and one-stop shopping behavior theoretically. He models how the changes in
the sellers’ market demand influence location choices. In particular, he decomposes two
effects: a negative substitution effect generated by competition for consumers’ demand
and a positive market area effect generated from joint location of sellers. If the increase
in demand from joining the bigger market is higher than the effect of fiercer competition,
co-location becomes the optimal choice. This will in turn become a positive externality
for the incumbents already there. Stahl finds that co-location is an equilibrium outcome
as long as customers are choosy enough about the variety of commodities.3
Our study speaks to the empirical literature on store choices. Messinger and Narasimhan
(1997) formulate and estimate a model on grocery data that aims to explain the growth
in one-stop shopping. Using U.S. data, they find that increased income and reduced store
operation costs have both increased supermarket assortment and the gains from one-stop
shopping. Over the period 1961-1986 they find that reduction in shopping time has led
to a 2.2% reduction of households’ expenditures on grocery products. Bell et al. (1998)
model store choice behavior based on fixed and variable cost of shopping, attributing the
former to the shopping list (products and quantities) and the latter to travel cost and
store loyalty. They abstain from differences in store assortment. They also take the model
to data for a bigger U.S. city, and find support for fixed cost – shopping list heterogeneity
being a major factor behind store choices. Fox et al. (2004) undertake an exploratory
analysis estimating a model on consumer reported data on purchases to understand how
marketing policies affect shopping behavior across retail store formats. Vitorino (2012)
looks at how positive and negative spillovers among firms affect location choices. She
finds empirical support for firms co-locating despite potential business stealing effects.
Her results suggest that the size of these effects determines the number of firms that can
operate in a given local market. Picone et al. (2009) suggest that even if competitive
forces make firms prefer distancing, they might end up co-locating because of few location
options. Not surprisingly, this seems to be a more likely outcome among firms selling dif-
ferentiated products. Related to the questions on store choices, Thomassen et al. (2017)
study pricing in supermarkets. They estimate cross-category pricing effects, and find
that the effects are higher the more consumers that prefer one-stop shopping. This has
to do with these consumers being inclined to switch all their purchases to another store in
response to a price change on one product category. Since supermarkets fully internalize
the cross-category pricing effects (in contrast to specialized stores), one-stop shopping
3There are several theoretical studies modelling store choice and store location. Beggs (1994) looks
at the rationale for malls rather than large department stores by modelling demand and pricing com-
plementarities. Smith and Hay (2012) model competition between shopping centers, in particular, how
agglomeration effects between products are accommodated through different organizational structures
and to which extent competition in prices and product quality is internalized. They consider three sce-
narios: streets (no internalization), malls (developers internalize) and supermarkets (where both shops
and developer internalize).
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contributes to greater price competition.
Several empirical studies have analyzed spatial competition between retail outlets
more generally. Lindsey et al. (1991) analyze the video-cassette-retail market in Alberta
to understand product variety and pricing. In a more recent study of the video-retail mar-
ket, Seim (2006) finds empirical support for firms using spatial differentiation in order
to reduce local competition. Smith (2004) estimates consumer choice in the U.K. super-
market industry using data on profit margins to deduct price parameters in consumer
utility. Davis (2004) estimates a demand model where products are location specific and
consumers have preferences over geographic proximity and store/product characteristics,
to understand substitution patterns between U.S. motion picture exhibition theaters. He
concludes that travel costs result in limited theater (store) substitutability and localized
markets. Houde (2012) estimates a structural model of spatial competition using con-
sumers’ commuting paths as instruments for the consumers’ locations in a Hotelling-like
model, using data from the Quebec City retail gasoline market. Based on the model, he
simulates the effects of a merger, and shows that compared to a reduced form diff-in-diff
analysis of the actual merger, the spatial model performs well. Turola (2016) estimates
the intensity of competition in the French grocery retail sector. She builds a structural
spatial competition model, where demand depends on both geography and heterogene-
ity in the customers’ shopping lists. She recovers price-cost margins, and finds that the
competitive pressure is very localized and depends on the presence of nearby competitors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy, Section
3 presents the data and takes a first look at the market. In Section 4 we present and
discuss our econometric results, and robustness is discussed in Section 4.3. In Section 5
we present a simple theory framework where we discuss the estimated effects, where we
also simulate an outcome mirroring the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Empirical strategy
We want to explore how proximity to a discount variety store (in our case, Europris)
affects grocery store sales. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that during our
sample period, 69 Europris stores were established or relocated. Some grocery stores in
our sample were affected by a Europris establishment in the sense that the distance to the
closest Europris store changed after the establishment or relocation, while others were
unaffected, enabling us to use a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the effect on grocery
store sales of having a discount variety store in the vicinity.4
We refer to grocery stores that were affected by Europris establishments as treatment
stores and to grocery stores that were unaffected as control stores. We know the distance
to the closest Europris store for all the grocery stores in our data set in every week of
our sample period. This implies that regardless of whether we look at relocations or new
entries, we always consider a change from a given pre-distance. Hence, the estimated
effect of a relocation and a new entry will be parallel, and we do not need to distinguish
between these when evaluating the results. From now on, we will refer to both of them
as establishments. Furthermore, while some of the treated grocery stores ended up with
a Europris store next door after an establishment, other treatment stores remained some
distance away. This allows us to break down the effect of a Europris establishment by
distance bins and to explore how the effect of having a discount variety store close by
depends on the distance between the stores. The underlying assumption that allows us
to interpret our results causally is that the underlying trend in the grocery store sales is
not dependent on treatment status. We provide visual support for this common trend
assumption and show a Granger causality test in the Robustness section (section 4.3).
Since both the grocery chain and Europris have national pricing strategies, it is very
unlikely that prices in local grocery stores are affected by the distance to the closest
Europris store.5 We are therefore confident that any effects of a Europris establishment
will manifest themselves through changes in the sales volume and store visits in the
grocery store (rather than in changes in prices).
A central distinction in our analysis is between one-stop and two-stop shopping. In
some places, the grocery store and Europris are located close enough to one another for
customers to reach both stores from the same parking area. We define one-stop shopping
locations as those where the distance between the stores is 250 meters or less. In some
4We focus on grocery stores that experience a reduction in distance to the closest Europris store.
During our sample period, the locations of all grocery stores are fixed, implying that any changes in
distance stem from Europris entries or relocations.
5Meile (2020) studies the price setting of Norwegian grocery retail chains empirically, and finds that
the grocery chain we consider follows a national, uniform pricing strategy. Uniform national pricing is
also confirmed in Friberg, Steen and Ulsaker (2021). Regarding Europris, we look at the information on
the chain’s website. We find that the online prices (which at least apply to home delivery and in-store
pickup) do not differ across stores and that weekly ads apply throughout the chain, suggesting that prices
are decided centrally.
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of our analyses we lump together all cases where the distance is above 250 meters as
two-stop locations, while in other analyses we break down the two-stop locations into
distance bins.
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3 Data and a first look at the market
3.1 Data
We combine data from several sources. The main data set used in our analyses is sales
data received from the grocery chain. We have weekly sales data at the store-category
level as well as weekly store visits. We have data from all product categories, which
implies that we can both look at total weekly sales at the store level and separate out
sales for products that are also sold at Europris. The sample period is from 11 January
2016 to 22 December 2019.
The next step is to compile geographical location data. We obtained data on the
address, opening date and closing date (where applicable) of all Europris stores in Norway
directly from the chain (Europris, 2020). The data was received on 11 February 2019.6
The sales data from the grocery chain also contains information about the grocery stores’
addresses. The exact locations of the Europris and grocery stores were obtained through
Google Maps Platform’s Geocoding API.7
For a given grocery store in a given week, we want to find the distance and driving
duration to the closest Europris store. To calculate distance and duration, we use the
routing service of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA).8 For each grocery
store and each week, we then use the distance and duration of the closest Europris store
that was open in the week in question.
We include a number of additional control variables in our regressions. Statistics
Norway publishes yearly municipality level data on persons and land area, as well as
median after tax income and the percentage of the population with higher education
(Statistics Norway 2020a,b,c). From the grocery chain, we obtained a data set with yearly
information about all grocery stores in Norway (from all chains), including information
about revenue at the store level. This data set was used to calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) at the municipality level, using market shares both at the store
level and at the chain level.
3.2 A first look at the market
6With updates on 2 July 2019 and 15 May 2020.
7See https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/overview for documentation of
this service. The locations were obtained on 15 October 2020.
8See https://labs.vegdata.no/ruteplandoc/ for documentation of this routing service. The routing
service was accessed on 15 October 2020, which means that all duration and distances were calculated
with the road network that applied on that date.
9
3.2.1 Discount variety retail in Norway
Among discount variety retailers in Norway, Europris is the largest with a market share
of about 30%.9 Since its foundation in 1992, both revenues and the number of stores
have grown steadily, reaching more than six billion NOK in revenue and 264 stores in
2019. While the compound annual grown rate for total retail was about 3% for 2012-
2017, variety retail grew almost twice as fast, suggesting that with overlapping product
ranges grocery chains were loosing market shares to variety retail (Europris ASA capital
markets day presentation 2018). Few other retail segments than discount variety retailers
can look back at a similar increase in revenues in recent years. Table 1 and table 2 show
the growth in Europris revenues and the number of store establishments and relocations
in the years we consider (Europris ASA annual report 2017; Europris ASA annual report
2019).
Table 1: Europris growth rate 2016-2019
2016 2017 2018 2019
Growth in Revenues 9.8% 6.6% 7.3% 7.2%
Table 2: Europris establishments and relocations 2016-2019
2016 2017 2018 2019
New stores 11 11 9 6
Relocated stores 11 7 8 6
According to the latest Shopper Trend report (Nielsen 2020), more than 50% of the
respondents answered that they had bought groceries from a discount variety retailer
within the last six months, and the store most frequently visited was Europris.
A comparison of the assortment in Europris and the grocery chain shows that the
extent of product overlap is large: as much as 35% of the grocery chain’s product cat-
egories are also sold in Europris stores, and these product categories amount to 25% of
the grocery chain’s turnover.10
The Norwegian producers are more concentrated as compared to producers in other
grocery markets e.g., Sweden. This, together with particular high tariff-barriers has led
to very strong national brands, and though increasing, private labels have a relatively
low share in the Norwegian grocery market. This implies that the same products are
9The first and second runners-up, Biltema and Clas Ohlson have approximately 20% and 15% respec-
tively.
10To find the product overlap, we first looked up all the product categories that Europris offers online
(such as detergent, filter coffee, and pick-and-mix candy). We then compared this to the data set we
obtained from the grocery chain, which includes information about product categories.
10
often found in different stores - even across grocery chains. This is indeed also the case
for many of the products that are sold by both Europris and the grocery chain.
The grocery stores
Our data sample consists of 190 distinct grocery stores. The stores are distributed all
over Norway, but only stores located in municipalities where Europris establishments or
relocations took place during our sample period place are included. Because retail com-
petition is likely to function differently in city centres than in suburban and rural areas,
we drop observations in the municipalities of Oslo, Bergen city center and Trondheim city
center. In the main analysis, we also disregard stores in the vicinity of Europris entries
but where it is unclear whether the distance to the closest Europris store was reduced
or not after entry.11 The number of active grocery stores in a given week ranges from
149 to 180. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of the stores by distance to the closest
Europris store in the first and last sample week.
Figure 1: Density of grocery stores over distance to closest Europris store
Most of the grocery stores are located within a few kilometers of a Europris store, and
the distribution shifts slightly to the left over the period we consider. In the first week,
134 out of 149 grocery stores are closer than 15 km to Europris. In the last week, the
same is true for 175 out of 180 stores. The summary statistics in Table 3 provide closer
details.
11In some cases, whether or not entry reduces the distance between the grocery store and the closest
Europris store depends on the direction of travel or the exact route chosen. In appendix A.3 we include
the model outcomes when these additional 16 stores are included
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Count Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75
Distance 34228 5.69 10.02 0.00 75.11 1.08 2.71 6.09
The average distance from a grocery store to the closest Europris is 5.69 km. The
shortest distance is 0.0 km, while the longest distance is about 75 km.
The main variables of interest are activity indicators: sales and store traffic.12 Table
4 shows the average store activity across all grocery stores in the data set.
Table 4: Average store activity
Weekly sales Store traffic
All stores 1 232 886 5503.63
Distance categories
As we argued above, the effect of establishment may depend on the distance between the
stores. Hence, we define the following distance categories:
Table 5: Distance categories
Distance bin Binary category
Same parking 1 One stop
250m-2km 2 Two stops
2km-5km 3 Two stops
5km-15km 4 Two stops
More than 15km 5 Two stops
The grocery stores in category 1 are located within 250 meters from a Europris store,
which we define as close enough for the customers to visit both the grocery store and
Europris in one stop. Table 6 below shows store activity by distance categories.
Table 6: Average store activity by distance category
Weekly sales Store traffic Number of stores
Same parking 1 341 951 5613.08 6
250m-2km 1 275 654 5980.73 67
2km-5km 1 265 425 5516.03 59
5km-15km 1 157 070 5176.06 45
More than 15km 1 076 884 4071.88 13
12Store traffic, as measured by the number of receipts, refers to the number of customers visiting per
week.
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The grocery stores that can be reached from the same parking area as a Europris store
have the highest weekly sales and second highest store traffic, while the stores with the
longest distance to a Europris store have the lowest turnover and store traffic. Overall,
however, the differences are not large between the groups.
The store composition: Control and treatment groups
For descriptive purposes, we consider the 142 stores that are never affected as control
stores and the 48 stores that at some point become affected as treatment stores.13 Table
7 and Table 8 summarize the distance statistics by treatment status.
Table 7: Summary statistics for control group
Count Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75
Distance 24738 4.43 4.76 0 40.07 1.30 2.96 6.04
Table 8: Summary statistics for treatment group
Count Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75
Pre-distance 9490 15.66 19.67 0.41 75.11 3.03 5.67 23.05
Post-distance 9490 3.11 6.32 0.00 31.37 0.31 1.01 2.20
Change 9490 12.55 17.87 0.34 71.76 1.95 3.61 13.18
The average distance to Europris in the control group is 4.4 km, the shortest distance
is 0.0 km and the longest distance is 40.1 km. 75% of the stores in the control group are
located less than 6.0 km from a Europris store, 50% less than 3.0 km and 25% less than
1.3 km.
Compared to the control group stores that have an average distance to the closest
Europris store of 4.4 km, the treatment stores were on average less exposed to Europris
prior to the establishments (15.7 km), but are on average more exposed to Europris in
the post-period (3.1 km).
Looking at the change within the treatment group, the relocations and new estab-
lishments led to an average change of approximately 12.6 km. In the pre-period, 50% of
the grocery stores were located less than 5.7 km from a Europris store, and 25% were
located less than 3.0 km away. In the post-period, 50% are located less than 1.0 km from
Europris and 25% less than 310 meters. This shift is illustrated in Figure 2 below:
13Table 1 in Appendix A.1 shows the number of stores by treatment status and distance category.
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Figure 2: Density of grocery stores in the treatment group over distance
In the first week, 30 treatment stores are closer than 15 km from Europris and 12
stores are further away. In the last week, 46 out of 48 treatment stores are located within
15 km from Europris. Tables 9 and 10 below present the store activity measures by
treatment status and whether the established Europris stores can be visited from the
same parking area as the grocery stores in the post-period.
Store activity by treatment status
As many as 25% of our grocery stores ended up with a Europris store much closer than
previously. As we saw from Figure 2 the shift was significant for most stores. To which
extent does this shift result in a change in the activity level? Below in Tables 9 and 10,
we scrutinize the change in two measures of activity level.
Table 9: Average weekly sales
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 1 196 403 -
One stop 1 381 962 1 622 909 1 546 380 17.44 %
Two stops 1 189 723 1 302 516 1 264 461 9.48 %
Table 10: Average weekly store traffic
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 5508.14 -
One stop 6015.57 6552.26 6350.64 8.92 %
Two stops 4975.26 5130.27 5170.74 3.12 %
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We find that for both measures, activity increases after the change. There is also a
distinct pattern where the effect is between two and three times higher for the one-stop
establishments, as compared to cases where customers need to drive between the two
stores. However, these figures represent only a before-after effect. Obviously this change
might be correlated with market growth stemming from other sources. The table also
provides control group averages, and in the next section we will use a diff-in-diff approach
where we use the activity development in the 142 non-affected stores as a control for
general market growth. Note that we also account for the latter group’s distance to the
closest Europris stores and store heterogeneity through store fixed effects.
In Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix A.2, we show sales and store traffic by treatment
status and post-period distance categories. We observe that generally, the effect from
a new establishment falls with distance. For weekly store traffic we even see negative
numbers for the 2-5 km bin, or basically no effect (0.93%) for the corresponding bin for
weekly sales.
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4 A diff-in-diff analysis of co-location effects
The descriptive analysis above suggested that the arrival of a new discount variety store
close by affects the activity level of the grocery stores. In fact, to the extent that we
could see some clear patterns, co-location – and, in particular, co-location allowing for
one-stop shopping – increased the incumbent grocery stores’ traffic and sales. Regarding
the effect of vicinity in terms of distance when customers need to drive between the
stores, the descriptive evidence of an increase in grocery store activity is weaker. Now,
we investigate these effects econometrically, where we control both for the development
in these measures over time in other grocery stores not affected by establishments, and
for the competitive environment faced by the different stores and the demographics of
the area.
4.1 Diff-in-diff analysis disregarding product heterogeneity
Our diff-in-diff model includes several control variables for local competition and local
demographics. We estimate the following generic model:
ln(yit) = αi + λt + ηXit + βDit + εit
Where y is a measure of activity, either weekly sales or store traffic. Subscript i,
refers to store, and t refers to week. The matrix Xit consists of several local controls:
Municipality Herfindal-Hirchman indices on grocery store level, grocery chain level and
grocery chain-umbrella level to control for local and national competition. Demographics
are included through inhabitants per square kilometer, inhabitants per store and the
share of higher education in the municipality. All controls are changing annually and by
municipality. We include fixed effects for store (αi) and week-year (λt), and we allow for
clustered standard errors on the store level.
Our diff-in-diff parameter is β, which measures the effect of the change in distance to
the closest Europris store for the stores in the treatment group. Dit is thus our treatment
variable that for store i in the treatment group takes the value 0 prior to the Europris
establishment, and 1 after.
In Table 11 we estimate the overall effect of a reduction in distance to Europris on
the grocery store for the two activity measures:
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Table 11: Effect of establishment
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Establishment -0.00428 -0.0125
(0.0207) (0.0179)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.835 0.839
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Using this overall approach, we find no significant effects of the new arrivals of Eu-
ropris stores. However, this is an overall average effect that combines the effects from
both nearby establishments and more distant ones. As we argued above and later show
in a simple theoretical model, there are reasons to believe that the sign of the effect may
depend on the distance between the grocery store and the newly established Europris
store. We could then fail to find an overall effect even if there are actually significant
effects for the different co-location distance bins. Hence, we next differentiate the treat-
ment effect into bins for different co-location distances, and extend the model to allow
for more treatment dummy variables:




Now, each βb refers to a separate distance bin. We start by differentiating between
one-stop and two-stop shopping: Comparing our distance bin 1 to distance bins 2 to 5
(as defined in Table 5). In Table 12 we show the results:
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Table 12: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.0986** 0.0618
(0.0487) (0.0405)
Two stops -0.0390** -0.0377**
(0.0189) (0.0176)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In line with the descriptive figures above in Tables 9 and 10, we now obtain a very clear
result. For both activity measures we find that one-stop co-location increases the grocery
stores’ turnover and store traffic in the range of 6% to 10%. The results reported in Table
12 suggest that the net effect of establishment is negative for the grocery stores where
one-stop shopping is not possible. This applies to both sales and traffic, considering
the reduced activity in the order of -4%. Thus, when accounting for underlying time
trends using a control group and when including control variables, the apparent positive
effect observed in Tables 9 and 10 only holds for grocery stores where one-stop shopping
becomes possible after the establishment of a Europris store. For the other grocery stores,
the estimated effect is negative.
That co-location can be beneficial to the incumbent grocery store is in line with most
of the models looking at one-stop shopping. The positive effect found for establishments
that allow for one-stop shopping suggests that the net effect of the positive agglomeration
effect (what we refer to as the extensive margin) and the negative competition effect (what
we refer to as the intensive margin) is positive for these stores. We expect that both effects
are present also when two stops are required to visit both a grocery store and a Europris
store, but that their relative magnitude may depend on the distance between the stores.
Our next step is therefore to differentiate the treatment effects even further, allowing
for different distance bins for the “two-stop-shopping” group of stores. Now we estimate
separate effects for all our five distance bins. The results are shown in Table 13.
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Table 13: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Same parking 0.0986** 0.0619
(0.0487) (0.0405)






More than 15km -0.0170 -0.0120
(0.0154) (0.0243)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Now an interesting pattern emerges. The effect of an establishment is positive when
the stores can be reached from the same parking area. When the stores are between 250
meters and two km apart, there is no statistically significant effect. When the distance
between the stores is between two and five km, an establishment reduces sales by 8%.
When the distance is even larger, the effect diminishes and becomes statistically insignif-
icant for stores where the distance is more than 15 km. Figure 3 illustrates how the
effects on grocery weekly sales and traffic vary with distance to the new Europris store.
We observe that both activity measures have an S-shaped pattern.
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Figure 3: Illustration of estimated S-shape
4.2 Diff-in-diff analysis accounting for product heterogeneity
Clearly, we would anticipate to observe heterogeneous effects of Europris establishments
depending on whether we look at competing or non-competing product categories. We
now estimate our model where we allow the treatment effect to depend on the product
type. Hence, we include product interactions in our model:







As before, each βb refers to separate distance bins, but now we estimate separate effects
for all bins for competing product categories (sold by both chains) and non-competing
product categories (only sold by the grocery chain).14 To do so we include separate
interactions for each bin, where the indicator Compi takes the value 1 for products in
categories that are sold by both chains. This allows us to identify separate effects across
product groups as measured by the βsb . In Table 14 we show the results.
14The grocery store data has information about category sales at different levels of aggregation. We
consider an intermediate level of aggregation, which refers to categories such as ketchup, chocolate bars
and detergents.
20
Table 14: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0133
(0.0155)
Difference competing, same parking -0.0241**
(0.00937)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0263***
(0.00661)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0275***
(0.0101)
Difference competing, 5km-15km 0.000863
(0.00623)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0115***
(0.00189)















Clustered (by stores) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In rows 11 to 15 in Table 14, we also calculate the gross effects for the competing
product categories and their respective standard errors.15
Separating competing and non-competing product categories, we find a similar pat-
tern as we did for all products overall: One-stop shopping increases the activity level,
suggesting that the extensive margin dominates. For other distance bins, the estimates
are negative, suggesting that the competition effect prevails if the stores cannot be reached
from the same parking area. The interaction-term-treatment parameters (βsb ) are nega-
tive and significant for most of the bins, indicating that the competing products are more
prone to competition from the Europris stores. For instance, in the groups that have a
new Eurpris store two to five km away, the competition effect increases from -7.4% to
-10.1%, a difference of 2.7 percentage points that is also highly significant. Additionally,
we now find a negative and significant parameter for the competing product categories for
the distance bin ’250m-2km’ which is both bigger (-4.9%) and now significant, as opposed
to what we found above for all products. This is what we would intuitively anticipate:
competition over products that are offered by both the incumbent grocery store and the
entering discount variety store is expected to be higher.
Interestingly, the gross effect for one-stop shopping for the competing product cat-
egories is not significant (though with a p-value equal to 0.116). On the other hand,
the difference parameter βsb for the ’same parking’ bin is only significant at a 5% level.
Hence, in terms of significance it is not obvious that the effect of co-location with common
parking is much different across the product groups. Actually, on a 1% level the models
conclude that the effect is the same for the two product groups.
In Figure 4 we illustrate how the effects on grocery weekly sales vary with distance to
the new Europris store for competing and non-competing product categories separately.
We observe an S-shaped pattern similar to the overall outcome (Figure 3).
15The estimates for the competing products categories are simply the sum of the interaction-term-
treatment parameters βsb and the treatment parameters βb.
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Figure 4: Illustration of estimated S-shape for competing and non-competing product
categories, (circles and diamonds illustrate significant estimates)
In Table 14, we look at all competing and non-competing product categories. To
explore the individual effects for some particularly relevant categories, we estimate the
model for product categories where the grocery chain and Europris clearly compete, and
for product categories where there is no competition. First, we estimate the effect for
candy, coffee and detergent, categories that are known to be important in the Europris
product portfolio, and where a number of strong national brands suggest that the products
sold in Europris and the grocery chain really do compete. The results are reported in
Table 15 below.
23
Table 15: Log weekly sales
Candy Coffee Detergent
Same parking 0.0384 0.0840* 0.0575
(0.0963) (0.0500) (0.0641)
0.25km - 2km -0.158*** -0.00233 -0.124***
(0.0438) (0.0318) (0.0332)
2km-5km -0.198*** -0.115*** -0.181***
(0.0608) (0.0248) (0.0358)
5km-15km -0.177*** -0.0994** -0.159***
(0.0497) (0.0441) (0.0500)
More than 15km 0.127*** -0.0535** -0.0982**
(0.0339) (0.0258) (0.0443)
Store FE X X X
Week-year FE X X X
Control variables X X X
Control income X X X
N 32236 32298 32325
r2 0.817 0.636 0.833
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
We still find a positive agglomeration effect for same-parking establishments, though
only weakly significant for coffee. More noteworthy, we find much stronger competition
effects. Already for establishments as close as 0.25-2 km, we see strong competition effects
and for the second category (2-5 km), the competition effects are strong (between minus
12-20%) and significant for all three product groups. Turning now to product groups that
are not sold in Europris stores, we estimate the effect for bread, fresh chicken and milk,
and present the results in Table 16.
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Table 16: Log weekly sales
Bread Fresh chicken Milk
Same parking 0.103** 0.139** 0.118**
(0.0499) (0.0647) (0.0544)
0.25km - 2km -0.0229 -0.0267 -0.0159
(0.0246) (0.0361) (0.0284)
2km-5km -0.0837*** -0.0451* -0.0891***
(0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0217)
5km-15km -0.0111 -0.0426 -0.0131
(0.0274) (0.0344) (0.0102)
More than 15km -0.0434 0.0120 0.00308
(0.0488) (0.0311) (0.0161)
Store FE X X X
Week-year FE X X X
Control variables X X X
Control income X X X
N 32325 32322 32325
r2 0.882 0.859 0.878
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The results from the overall regression in Table 14 are enhanced, the local agglomer-
ation effect now varies between 10 and 14%, as compared to 9% for the overall effect for
non-competing product categories in Table 14, but we still see evidence of a competition
effect from establishments further away.
4.3 Robustness
We perform two different exercises to make sure that our results are not biased by un-
derlying dynamics in the treatment and control groups.
First, we take a closer look at how sales evolve over time in the treatment and control
stores prior to the treatment taking place. We plot average monthly sales in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Pre-trends in sales
The dashed line represents the average monthly sales in stores that never receive
treatment, while the solid line shows the average monthly sales in treatment stores that
have not yet received treatment. The trends in sales in the two groups share dynamics,
suggesting that the activity changes in the control and treatment groups have a common
trend.
Second, since treatments occur at different times for different stores we choose to also
perform a Granger causality test. Following the approach used by Author (2003), we now
estimate:
ln(yti) = αi + λt + ηXit +
−1∑
τ=−2
ϕτDi1(t− T ∗i = τ) +
4∑
τ=0
φτDi1(t− T ∗i = τ) + εit
The binary indicator Di equals one if a store received treatment during the period we
consider. We interact Di with event-time dummies, 1(t−T ∗i = τ). The dummies take on
the value one when the time of observation (t) is τ ∈ [−2, 4] months from the treatment
month (T ∗i ). Earlier pre-months (t − T ∗i ≤ −2) serve as baseline. Observations more
than four months after a treatment are included through the dummy 1(t− T ∗i ≥ 4). The
coefficients on leads and lags of establishment are represented by ϕτ and φτ respectively.
If it is indeed the case that entries affect store activity, and not the other way around,
we expect non-significant leads and significant lags. The results of the estimation are
plotted below in Figure 6.
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(a) One stop (b) Two stops
Figure 6: Event study
Neither the one-stop results (Panel a) nor the two-stop results (Panel b) show sig-
nificant leads. This suggests that there are no anticipatory effects of establishments. In
Panel a, we notice a much higher and significant estimate in the month of establishment,
which is also sustained in the subsequent months. The lags provide evidence of increased
store activity in the post-periods. In Panel b, the lags are insignificant. Considering that
we found no significant treatment effect for half of the distance bins within two stops,
this is not surprising. Overall, the panels are consistent with what we observe in our
econometric analysis.
We undertake two additional sets of robustness tests. First we include stores that
have Europris entries in the vicinity but where it is unclear whether the entries reduce
the distance to the closest Europris store (refer Footnote 11). The results are presented in
Appendix A.3, Tables 4, 5 and 6. Next, we re-estimate the models excluding our control
variables. These results are presented in Appendix A.4, Tables 7, 8 and 9. Generally we
get the same results for the whole set of models. There are some marginal changes in sig-
nificance levels but, generally, all our results are robust to these alternative specifications
and data sets.
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5 Extensive- and intensive margins: How to under-
stand co-location forces
5.1 A simple theory model
In the empirical analysis we find that whether the grocery store ends up being better or
worse off upon Europis’ entry depends on the distance between the two stores. We also
find a clear S-shaped pattern. The effect ultimately depends on the distance between
the two stores. If Europris ends up sufficiently close, the grocery store tends to benefit.
In contrast, an establishment that does not bring Europris close enough appears to be
harmful. We attribute these findings to the interplay between the extensive margin
(increased localized demand) and the intensive margin (fiercer competition and reduced
purchases by existing customers). In this section, we develop a simple theoretical example
that shows how decomposing the effect into an extensive and an intensive margin provides
an intuitive explanation of the results.
Suppose that the market is represented by a line that starts at 0 and ends at an
indefinite point. the grocery store is located at xG = 0. It sells n products at a common
price p. The customers are uniformly distributed at discrete intervals along the line. They
value store proximity, and face travel costs (t) that increase in distance to the grocery
store. Hence, the utility a customer located at x obtains from shopping at the grocery
store is given by
uG = nv − tx− np
Where v is the customer’s gross willingness to pay per product. Note that the customers
only shop at the grocery store if the utility exceeds their reservation utility uR
16.
Pre Europris establishment
Consider first a market without a Europris store located close enough to affect the grocery
store’s demand. The consumer that is indifferent between shopping and not shopping at
the grocery store is located at
x̂ =
nv − np− uR
t
.
The location of the grocery store and the indifferent consumer is illustrated in figure 7.
16The reservation utility reflects the attractiveness of the customers’ outside options, such as rival
grocery stores.
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Figure 7: Pre establishment
The figure also shows that the grocery store’s demand before a Europris establishment
is given by
DG = x̂ =




Suppose then that Europris establishes a store at xE ∈ [0, x̂]. Europris offers one of the
products sold by the grocery store, but at a lower price αp, where α ∈ (0, 1). The utility
of just shopping at the grocery store is unchanged, but the customers might obtain an
additional value by purchasing the cheaper product from Europris. Visiting both stores
provides a utility equal to
uE,G = nv − (n− 1)p− αp− tx− t(xE − x)− F
for customers located at x ∈ (0, xE), and
uE,G = nv − (n− 1)p− αp− tx− F
for customers located at x > xE
17. The parameter F denotes the additional cost that
customers face if the stores cannot be visited in one stop, i.e., unless xE ≤ 250m. We
find that the location of the consumer that is indifferent between just shopping at the
grocery store and shopping at both the grocery store and Europris is given by




The shorter the distance between the grocery store and Europris, the more customers
prefer joint shopping. The customer that is indifferent between shopping at both stores
and none of them is located at
x̂′ =
nv − p(n− 1)− αp− uR − F
t
.
17These customers pass Europris on their way to the grocery store and no extra travel costs occur. We
assume that the customers do not care where on the way Europris is located, only about whether they
have to stop once or twice.
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Consequently, customers that only shop at the grocery store are located to the left of x̃,
while customers who shop at both stores are located between x̂′ and x̃. Figure 8 outlines
the grocery store’s exclusive demand (DG) and shared demand (DE,G).
Figure 8: Post establishment
The extensive margin
For customers to the right of xE, the presence of Europris increases the utility of travelling
to the left on the line. As a result, some of the customers that previously did not shop
at the grocery store change their mind now that they can visit Europris during the same
trip. This effect is what we refer to as the extensive margin in response to a Europris
establishment. Graphically, the extensive margin is captured by x̂′ being located further
to the right than x̂. New grocery store customers are given by
x̂′ − x̂ = 1
t
(p(1− α)− F )
Since the new customers purchase (n− 1) products from the grocery store and 1 product
from Europris, the increase in the grocery store’s revenue equals
(x̂′ − x̂)p(n− 1)
The intensive margin
After the Europris establishment, some of the customers who previously purchased all n
products from the grocery store decide to purchase the discounted product from Europris.
This response to the increased competition is called the intensive margin. For the grocery
store this effect is always negative as it implies lower demand. A comparison of figure 7
and figure 8 shows how the customers located between x̂ and x̃ went from being exclusive
grocery store customers to becoming shared customers in the wake of the establishment.
Formally, we have that




customers purchase less at the grocery store. This corresponds to a revenue loss equal to
(x̂− x̃)p
The total effect is simply the sum of the gained revenues due to the extensive margin and
the lost revenues due to the intensive margin.
5.2 Numerical illustration of the co-location forces
Figure 9 graphs the effect of a Europris establishment on the grocery store revenues. It
shows the effects from the extensive margin, the intensive margin and the total. The
parameter values are set to v = 1, t = 2, α = 0.5, n = 10, p = 0.75, uR = 0, 1 and
F = 0.33 .
Figure 9: Intensive vs extensive margin
Notice that the effect of the extensive margin is dominating when the distance between
Europris and the grocery store is short. There are two main reasons for this. First, the
customers do not have to make an additional stop to visit Europris, which attracts more
customers. Second, the gain from attracting a new customers is greater than the loss
from an exclusive customer turning into a shared customer. Recall that new customers
purchase (n − 1) products, while shared customers only purchase one product less than
before the Europris establishment. However, as the distance between the grocery store
and Europris increases, the effect of the intensive margin becomes dominant. When
shopping at both stores requires two stops, a Europris establishment might not attract
sufficiently many customers for the grocery store to benefit from it. Eventually, the
competition effect also fades out and the total effect approaches zero.
While the predictions from our modelling framework will be sensitive to the parame-
ters chosen, we do find in Figure 9 a very similar pattern to the S-shape observed in our
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empirical analysis, as illustrated in, e.g., Figure 3. The observed and estimated S-shape
is thus consistent with a simple theoretical framework.
6 Conclusion
We analyze a number of entries and relocations by the Norwegian discount variety chain
Europris during the period 2016 to 2019. We measure how location choices affect lo-
cal grocery stores’ sales and traffic, using a diff-in-diff strategy and data from a large
Norwegian grocery chain. We combine detailed data on travelling distance between new
entries/relocations and local grocery stores and data on local grocery store activity to
measure the entry effects. The granularity of the data enables us to estimate separate
effects for competing and non-competing product categories.
We find significant effects from entries and relocations. Moreover, our findings suggest
an S-shaped relationship between distance and store activity; sufficiently close entries
increase local demand since more customers are attracted to the market, but as the
distance increases the competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and
local grocery sales and traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is
gradually reduced to zero. We show that this empirical finding can be squared with a
simple location theory model, showing a similar pattern.
When Europris is not locating very close to the grocery chain we consider, it could
possibly locate close to a rival grocery chain. This might obviously increase the rival
grocery chain’s attractiveness, and thus represent a negative competitive effect for our
grocery chain. Since we do not control for the neighbouring stores at Europris’ new
location in our analysis, this effect would be embedded in the negative competition effect
we observe in our data. If Europris locates near a rival, it would increase the value of the
rival’s location and shift more local demand towards the competing grocery store.
Most of the empirical literature accommodating local competition in retail markets
treats local competition as a linear effect: the closer a competitor is located, the fiercer
the competition (see e.g., Seim (2006) and Picone et al. (2009)). In line with existing
literature, we do find that a competitive effect is present, but our results also suggest
that this competition effect is dominated by a local and positive agglomeration effect
leading to more demand if the distance between stores stores is short enough. However,
the agglomeration effect seems to be very local: as soon as the consumer needs to travel
even short distances between the stores, the agglomeration effect wears off and becomes
dominated by the negative competition effect.
Our results are clearly supporting some of the insights from theory, like Stahl’s (1982)
conjectures that depending on product overlap and demand heterogeneity co-location
can be positive. Moreover, our findings are in line with what others have found, such
as Vitorini (2012) who finds empirical support for firms co-locating despite potential
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business stealing effects. Picone et al. (2009) find that co-location is more likely if
the firms sell differentiated products. However, this does not necessarily imply that co-
location requires maximal differentiation. Our results suggest that even a relatively large
product overlap is compatible with co-location. We complement existing literature by
providing evidence that the net effect of agglomeration forces and competitive pressure
depends on the distance between the stores.
Our results also have relevance for the ongoing public discussion on store location
policies in several countries. Some countries (e.g., Denmark and Sweden) have imposed
local competition regulations regarding new store locations to maximise local competition.
Our results seem to support the development of larger areas where several shops can be
established (e.g.in malls), sharing joint parking areas rather than regulating areas for
single store establishments. The stores can anticipate higher local demand, though they
will be exposed to a competitive effect from stores offering competing products. The first
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Appendix
A.1 Store number by distance category and treatment status







More than 15km 3
A.2 Store activity distance bins and treatment status
Table 2: Average weekly sales
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 1 196 403 -
Same parking 1 381.962 1 622 909 1 546.38 17.44 %
250m-2km 1 247.753 1 402 328 1 343.209 12.39 %
2km-5km 1 227.563 1 239 016 1 251.796 0.93 %
5km-15km 814 134 848 312 842 879 4.20 %
More than 15km 1 044 728 1 118 496 1 107 640 7.06 %
Table 3: Average weekly store traffic
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 5508.14 -
Same parking 6015.57 6552.26 6350.64 8.92 %
250m-2km 5214.69 5481.83 5490.48 5.12 %
2km-5km 5421.41 5189.43 5382.92 -4.28 %
5km-15km 3636.14 3665.31 3687.39 0.80 %
More than 15km 3586.40 3781.66 3778.39 5.44 %
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A.3 Include unclear treatment stores
Table 4: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.0948** 0.0600
(0.0441) (0.0367)
Two stops -0.0446*** -0.0405***
(0.0165) (0.0155)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 34835 34835
r2 0.844 0.847
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Same parking 0.0951** 0.0604
(0.0441) (0.0367)






More than 15km -0.0180 -0.0114
(0.0142) (0.0225)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 34835 34835
r2 0.845 0.847
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0142
(0.0143)
Difference competing, same parking -0.0252***
(0.00855)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0228***
(0.00616)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0200**
(0.00843)
Difference competing, 5km-15km 0.00110
(0.00419)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0114***
(0.00183)















Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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A.4 Without control variables
Table 7: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.100** 0.0632
(0.0474) (0.0398)
Two stops -0.0473** -0.0433**
(0.0194) (0.0177)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
N 34228 34228
r2 0.838 0.842
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p0¡0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 8: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Same parking 0.100** 0.0633
(0.0474) (0.0398)






More than 15km -0.0179 -0.0105
(0.0129) (0.0229)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
N 34228 34228
r2 0.838 0.842
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
39
Table 9: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0146
(0.0130)
Difference competing, same parking -0.0247***
(0.00945)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0249***
(0.00654)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0270***
(0.0100)
Difference competing, 5km-15km -0.00361
(0.00678)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0110***
(0.00201)














Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
40
A.5 With income control variable
Table 10: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.104** 0.0636
(0.0498) (0.0418)
Two stops -0.0376* -0.0372**
(0.0192) (0.0178)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
Control income X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 11: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic








More than 15km -0.0203 -0.0132
(0.0157) (0.0245)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
Control income X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 12: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0165
(0.0158)
Difference competings, same parking -0.0241**
(0.00937)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0263***
(0.00661)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0275***
(0.0101)
Difference competing, 5km-15km 0.000863
(0.00623)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0115***
(0.00189)
















Clustered (by stores) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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